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Identifying Tax Effects on Charitable Giving
Executive Summary
This paper estimates the effects of three federal tax acts—the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (H.R. 1836), the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003 (H.R. 2), and the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (H.R. 1308)—on
charitable giving using the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study, the philanthropy module in the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  The Center Panel data have three advantages relative
to tax return data for the policy analysis of charitable giving.  The Center Panel (i) contains the
giving of non-itemizers as well as itemizers, permitting the analysis of the effect of switching
itemization status on giving; (ii) breaks aggregate giving down into giving to different types of
charitable organizations, permitting the analysis of tax effects on different types of charities; and
(iii) contains the PSID’s rich contextual information about family economics, permitting
important methodological and substantive advances.
The key results are that the 2001–2004 tax acts raised the tax price of giving among the
always-itemizers by 4.2 percent (Table 2), but this masks larger price changes: an 8.8 percent
average increase for itemizers experiencing a price rise and a 5.2 percent average decrease for
itemizers experiencing a price drop.  Itemization switchers (those who go from itemizing to not
itemizing, or vice versa) experienced larger price changes: on the order of 23 percent. 
Unconditional changes in giving indicate that both itemizers and switchers experiencing a price
drop, give more—consistent with a strong tax policy effect on giving.  Unconditional changes in
giving are much smaller (and sometimes positive) for those experiencing a price rise.
Multiple regression results that control for changes in income indicate a strong secular
giving response to changes in the tax price, by both switchers and itemizers (Table 3).   Moreover
for switchers, all types of giving are sensitive to tax-price—giving to help the poor, religious
giving, and the aggregate giving that would be reported in tax return data (Table 4).  In contrast,
the aggregate giving of itemizers is less sensitive to the tax price.  Hence, policy analysis with the
Center Panel data reveal different results than would be observable with tax return data.  The
Center Panel significantly expands the range of policy analysis that can be employed to examine
the tax effects on charitable giving.
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Abstract
This paper estimates the effects of three federal tax acts—the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (H.R. 1836), the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003 (H.R. 2), and the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (H.R. 1308)—on
charitable giving, and offers four extensions relative to previous work.  First, we use new
data—the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study, the philanthropy module in the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics—that permit the estimation of the effect of switches in itemization status on
giving.  This is important because switches permit a direct answer to the question: How much of
an increase in charitable giving is caused by tax deductibility?  Second, the new data permit the
estimation of tax effects on charitable giving to secular charities as well as to religious
organizations.  This is important because the main policy question in the literature on taxes and
giving is to evaluate “treasury efficiency”—whether the Treasury can cause more money to flow
to charitable organizations by allowing deductibility of giving than by eliminating deductibility
and sending the increased tax revenue directly to charitable organizations.  By using secular
giving, we can focus on the type of giving most relevant to this policy question.  Third, the new
data allow for improved methodological approaches over past studies.  Fourth, we argue that the
2001, 2003, and 2004 federal tax acts were timed such that they provide a set of tax changes
suitable for identifying permanent effects of taxes on giving.  The estimates based on the analysis
of families who switch itemization status suggest that secular giving is price elastic, implying
that treasury efficiency holds.  In contrast, estimates which impose the restrictions facing other
datasets suggest a statistically insignificant price elasticity.
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1. Introduction
The central question about taxes and giving is: How much of an increase in charitable
giving is caused by deductibility?  If tax deductibility causes a larger increase in charitable giving
than the associated reduction in tax revenue, then the Treasury can cause more money to flow to
charitable organizations by allowing deductibility of giving than by eliminating deductibility and
sending the increased tax revenue directly to charitable organizations.  For this reason, if tax
deductibility causes a larger increase in charitable giving than the reduction in tax revenue,
deductibility is said to be “treasury efficient.”
The standard indicator of treasury efficiency is whether a one percent decrease in the tax-
induced price of giving (price = 1 - marginal tax rate) causes more than a one percent increase in
giving—that is, whether giving is “price elastic.”  Therefore, the objective of the large literature
on taxes and giving is to estimate the price elasticity of giving and determine whether the
evidence is strong enough to conclude that giving is price elastic.
However, the literature is far from a consensus about whether giving is price elastic. 
Indeed, opposite conclusions about the price elasticity of giving have been reached by two
important papers in the literature.  Randolph (1995) concludes that the permanent response of
giving to the tax-induced price of giving is not elastic, and therefore that deductibility is not
treasury efficient.  By “permanent” response, Randolph means the giving response to a long-
term, sustained change in the price of giving.   In contrast, Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002)
conclude that the permanent price of giving is elastic, and hence that deductibility is treasury
efficient.
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In addition to the absence of consensus, the large literature on taxes and giving has three
serious limitations. First, the literature has not directly estimated the price elasticity of giving
among families who switch between itemizing deductions and not itemizing.  Therefore, the
literature has not directly considered how much of an increase in charitable giving is caused by
deductibility.  Rather, the literature has estimated the price elasticity of giving among families
who always itemize but over time are faced with drifting marginal tax rates, and used the
“always-itemizer” price elasticity to infer indirectly the “deductibility-switcher” price elasticity.
Second, when estimating the always-itemizer price elasticity of giving, the literature
typically uses aggregate giving.  Aggregate giving includes giving to charitable organizations that
provide human services, help people with basic needs, educate children, etc., but aggregate
giving also includes religious giving to churches, synagogues, and mosques.  However, religious
giving should not be included when trying to draw a conclusion about treasury efficiency because
the government is constitutionally prohibited from funding churches, synagogues, and
mosques—religious giving falls outside the bounds of the constitutionally-relevant treasury
efficiency question.  This might not be much of a practical problem if religious giving were a
small share of total giving, but religious giving makes up 40 percent of total giving (Brown and
Rooney 2007).
Third, the literature faces methodological constraints, especially in the availability of
what economists refer to as “instrumental variables” or simply “instruments.”  An instrumental
variable approach is necessary to estimate the permanent effect because “permanent” income and
price are not directly observable.  Indeed, the lack of consensus between Randolph’s results and
Auten et al.’s results hinges on the different ways they use instruments to identify the permanent
effect.  In such a circumstance, it is necessary to examine alternative instruments to see if they
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can resolve the lack of consensus.
The literature has not estimated the “deductibility-switcher” price elasticity, has not
excluded religious giving from its price elasticity estimates, and has restricted itself to a narrow
set of income-based instruments because that is all that can be done using the data at the
foundation of the literature on taxes and giving: the Treasury Department’s tax return data.  Tax
return data have many advantages, but do not include data on the giving of families who do not
itemize (hence, switchers cannot be observed), do not disaggregate giving into religious and
secular categories (hence, religious giving cannot be excluded from price elasticity estimates),
and consist mainly of income-based information (hence, there are no other variables that can
reasonably serve as alternative instruments in order to check conclusions about how much of the
observed price elasticity is a permanent effect).
Using new panel data on charitable giving—the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study, a
module collecting giving data in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)—we are able to
overcome all three limitations: we estimate the price elasticity of giving among switchers, while
not including religious giving in our measure of charitable giving.  And we can examine a variety
of alternative instruments to see if they can resolve the lack of consensus about the permanent
effect of taxes on giving. 
Our results, at this point to be regarded as preliminary, indicate that switching
deductibility has a large, price-elastic effect on charitable giving.  Specifically, the direct answer
to the constitutionally-relevant treasury efficiency question is that deductibility causes a larger
charitable giving increase than the reduction in tax revenue. In contrast, estimates which impose
the restrictions facing other datasets suggest a statistically insignificant price elasticity.  In
addition, we conclude that giving whose primary purpose is to provide human services or help
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the people with basic needs is also price-elastic.  Our results are preliminary for several reasons,
but the most important reason is that we have not fully implemented our strategy to determine
whether how much of the price elasticity we estimate is permanent.
2. Previous Literature
Randolph’s (1995) paper is important because it uses panel data on tax returns from
1979-1988, a time period during which there were two major tax policy changes.  The panel data
allow him to examine changes in giving in response to changes in tax rates, and thereby draw
stronger inferences about changes in tax rates causing changes in giving.  Randolph’s paper is
important also because he was the first to point out the distinction between permanent and
transitory responses to changes in tax rates.  He argued that, because a family can anticipate the
effects of pre-announced changes in tax rates and temporarily shift its giving to take advantage of
anticipated tax changes (the transitory response), analysts should model the family’s anticipation
of pre-announced tax changes.  Indeed, Randolph concluded that it was his modeling of the
anticipation of pre-announced changes in tax rates that led to his result that the permanent price
of giving is not elastic.
Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002) also use panel data from essentially the same time
period (1979-1993), so why do they reach the opposite conclusion about the permanent price
elasticity of giving?  The reason is that analysts must make a statistical assumption to identify the
permanent response from the transitory response in the data (only the combined permanent +
transitory response is observable), and Randolph and Auten et al. make different statistical
assumptions to identify the permanent response.  Furthermore, Auten et al. do not model a
person’s anticipation of pre-announced changes in tax rates, arguing that the data suggest people
Barrett, McGuirk and Steinberg (1997) and Bakija (2002) make statistical assumptions1
to identify the permanent price elasticity of giving similar to Randolph’s and also conclude that
the permanent price elasticity of giving is not elastic.
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do not respond to future changes in tax rates.1
The opposite conclusions reached by Randolph and Auten et al. are a motivation for our
present work, but there is another, equally important, motivation: two data limitations have
forced Randolph and Auten et al. (and virtually the entire literature on taxes and giving) to ask a
different question than the treasury efficiency question that is most policy-relevant.  The first data
limitation is that tax return data do not allow analysts to study directly the effect of deductibility
on giving.  The second limitation is that tax return data do not allow analysts to study the kind of
charitable giving that the government would be constitutionally permitted to replace should
deductibility be eliminated and the increased tax revenue sent directly to the charitable
organizations.
Instead of studying directly the effect of deductibility on giving, the taxes-and-giving
literature estimates the relationship between tax rates and giving among people who always
itemize.  However, it is the effect on giving among people switching from not itemizing to
itemizing or vice versa—switching the deductibility of giving—that is the direct parallel to the
treasury efficiency question: Does deductibility itself cause a larger charitable giving increase
than the reduction in tax revenue?  Virtually the entire literature on taxes and giving has asked a
different question—Does a change in tax rates among people who always itemize cause a larger
charitable giving increase than the reduction in tax revenue?—and assumed that the answer to the
question about “always itemizers” is the same as would be the answer to the switching-
deductibility question.  The always-itemizer question has been the focus of the literature because
The lowest match rate in Karlin and List’s experiment is very high: a 1:1 match,2
implying a $.50 price of giving.  The $.50 price is lower than the lowest price ($.65) currently
created by the top federal tax rate, so when Karlin and List examine higher match rates
(generating prices lower than $.50) they are varying the experimental price outside the range
created by current tax rates.  Nevertheless the experiment illustrates that it may not be acceptable
to assume that the answer to the always-itemizer question is the same as the answer to the
switching-deductibility question.
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tax return data (obviously) cannot measure a family’s charitable giving unless the family
itemizes.
There is good reason to think that the answer to the always-itemizer question will differ
from the answer to the switching-deductibility question. It often happens in empirical modeling
that responses to large discrete changes are different than responses to smaller price changes (cf.
Solon 1999, fn. 14).  Moreover, there is experimental evidence that precisely this may be
happening in charitable giving.  For instance, Karlin and List (2006) find that matching the
amount a person gives does increase giving but that further increases in the match rate do not
further increase giving.2
The second limitation of tax return data is that a tax return measures a family’s aggregate
giving to all the organizations to which it gives.  Tax return data do not disaggregate giving into
the amounts given to different kinds of charitable organizations.  However, one kind of charitable
giving—religious giving to churches, synagogues, and mosques for the purposes of sustaining
worship and spiritual development—could not be replaced constitutionally by government from
the increased tax revenue should deductibility be eliminated, and therefore falls outside the
bounds of the treasury efficiency question. 
Our present research estimates the tax price elasticity of giving, and makes four
contributions.  First, we estimate the price elasticity of giving using data from the 2001-2005
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waves of the PSID.  With the PSID data we are able to observe families who switch between
itemizing and not itemizing (or vice versa), and this lets us ask the switching-deductibility
question.  Of course, we can also ask the always-itemizer question.  We find that the two
questions have different answers for some kinds of giving.
Second, we estimate the tax price elasticity for giving to different kinds of charitable
organizations.  This lets us ask the constitutionally-relevant treasury efficiency question. Also,
we estimate the price elasticity of giving to provide human services and to help people with basic
needs, an issue of recent policy interest (see, for example, Preston 2007).
Third, work in this area faces methodological constraints, especially in the availability of
what economists refer to as “instrumental variables.” The PSID provides many more potential
instrumental variables other than the income-based instruments used by Randolph and Auten et
al.
Fourth, we examine the charitable giving response to tax changes enacted by the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (H.R. 1836), the Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (H.R. 2), and the Working Families Tax Relief Act of
2004 (H.R. 1308).  We argue that these acts are nearly ideal for estimating the permanent effect
of taxes on giving because the acts were passed in a way that mitigated a family’s ability to
anticipate tax changes.
3. The 2001, 2003, and 2004 Tax Acts
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 was signed into law on
June 7, 2001 and was effective immediately.  The 2001 Act scheduled gradual tax policy changes
that would reduce marginal tax rates over the years 2001-2010, and broaden the 15 percent tax
-8-
bracket for married-joint filers.  Federal marginal tax rates were scheduled to drop one
percentage point from their 2000 values of 15, 28, 31, 36, and 39.6 percent to 15, 27, 30, 35, and
38.6 percent in 2002 (plus the creation of a 10 percent rate for low taxable incomes).  The
gradual drop was to continue: another one point drop in 2004, and again in 2006 a one point drop
in the lower brackets and a 2.6 point drop in the top bracket; these 2006 rates were to remain in
effect through 2010.  The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 was signed
into law May 28, 2003 and made the 2006 rates effective immediately.
We will argue in more detail in Section 4 that the uncertainty surrounding the closeness
of the 2000 presidential election offered little chance for families to alter their giving in 2000 in
anticipation of tax changes that, from their 2000 perspective, might occur in 2001.  Whether or
not our argument that the 2001 Act could not have been anticipated in 2000, it is clear that the
2003 Act could not have been anticipated when people were doing their giving in 2002.  More
importantly, the 2003 Act considerably weakened incentives to shift giving from the future to
2003 (“give more now because tax rates will be lower in the future”) because rates were lowered
immediately to the levels originally designated for 2006 (15, 25, 28, 33, and 35 percent) and were
to remain at these levels until 2010.
Table 1 shows the federal tax rates in effect from 2000 through 2004.  The tax rate
changes induced changes in the price of giving for families that itemize, and Table 1 also shows
the prices in effect over 2000-2004 by 2000 income bracket.  Between 2000 and 2002 itemizers
in the lowest bracket saw a 5.9 percent increase in their price of giving, itemizers in the next
bracket saw no change in price, and the other itemizers saw increases from 1.4 percent (middle
bracket) to 1.7 percent (highest bracket).  Although the 2000-2002 percentage price increases
seen by middle-to-high bracket families were modest and fairly uniform, the percentage price
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increases in effect by 2004 were larger: from 4.2 percent at middle brackets to 7.6 percent at the
highest bracket.  Figure 1 shows how prices varied as a function of taxable income in 2000,
2002, and 2004.  Unlike Table 1, Figure 1 shows the additional variation caused by changes in
brackets.
The 2001 Act scheduled other changes that would have led families in 2002 to expect
higher future prices and also higher after-tax incomes.  The 2001 Act scheduled a gradual 
increase in the standard deduction available to married-joint filers relative to single filers (the
other part of what the Act did to eliminate the “marriage penalty”; typically standard deductions
increase year-to-year for both types of filers, but only nominally).  In 2000 the married-joint
standard deduction was 167 percent of the single standard deduction, but the 2001 Act scheduled
the married-joint standard deduction to increase to 174 percent (of the single standard deduction)
in 2005 and then increase in steps reaching 200 percent in 2009.  Increasing the standard
deduction increases the price of giving to the extent it induces married families to switch from
itemizing deductions to claiming the higher standard deduction, but the standard deduction
increases were not scheduled to begin until 2005. 
However, the 2003 Act immediately increased the married-joint standard deduction to
200 percent for the 2003 and 2004 tax years, but the immediate increase was also temporary
because the 2005 married-joint standard deduction would revert back to 174 percent (as
originally designated by the 2001 Act) in 2005 and resume its gradual increase to reach 200
percent in 2009.  Note that the 2003-2004 increase in the married-joint standard deduction could
not have been anticipated by families in 2002 and hence likely had no effect on 2002 giving. 
However, some families would have expected the price of giving to be lower in 2005 (when the
married-joint standard deduction dropped back to 174 percent), and may have been delaying
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giving they would have otherwise done in 2004 in order to take advantage of the lower price of
giving in 2005.
Such expectations and incentive to delay giving were eliminated by the Working Families
Tax Relief Act of 2004 signed into law on October 4, 2004.  The 2004 Act kept the married-joint
standard deduction at 200 percent for 2005-2010.  Families no longer expected the 200 percent
married-joint standard deduction to end in 2005.  Had a family been delaying its giving from
2004 to 2005 (anticipating that the price of giving would be lower in 2005) it would have had
from October 4 until the end of the year to undo the delay.
The 2001, 2003, and 2004 Tax Acts created a time pattern of changes in the upper
threshold for the 15 percent bracket for married joint filers that paralleled the time pattern of
changes in the married-joint standard deduction just described.  The 2001 Act scheduled a
gradual increase in the upper threshold from 167 percent of the single-filer upper threshold: the
increase was to start in 2005 and reach 200 percent in 2008.  The 2003 Act immediately and
temporarily increased the threshold to 200 percent of the single-filer upper threshold for 2003
and 2004, but the 2004 Act kept the threshold at 200 percent for 2005-2010.
The 2001, 2003, and 2004 Tax Acts created a similar time pattern of changes in the child
tax credit.  The 2001 Act scheduled a gradual increase in the child credit from its 2000 level of
$500 to $1,000 in 2010.  The 2003 Act immediately and temporarily increased the credit to
$1,000 for 2003 and 2004, but then the 2005 credit was to revert back to $700, the level
designated by the 2001 Act.  The 2004 Act kept the child credit at $1,000 for 2005-2010.
4. An Empirical Model of Giving as a Function of Tax Policy
In this section we describe an equation which depicts charitable giving as a function of a
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number of other variables; in the following sections we will empirically estimate the parameters
of this equation.  Our baseline equation is:
it 1 it it + 1 t 1 it + 1 t 1 it it + 1 t 1 it + 1 tg   =  ô   ( p  ! E(p | I ) )  + ð   E(p | I )  +  è  ( y  ! E(y | I ) )  +  ö   E(y | I )  
(1)
it i 0 it+  X N â  +    á     +   á  t    +    u  
it itwhere g  is the giving done by family  i  in year  t,  p   is family i’s price of giving (one minus the
it it + 1 tmarginal tax rate),  y   is after-tax permanent income.  The term E(p | I ) represents family i’s
texpectation in year  t  of what its price of giving will be in year  t + 1 based on the information  I
it + 1 tthe family has in year  t.  E(y | I ) is the expectation of next year’s after-tax permanent income. 
iThe term  á   represents unobservable and time-invariant characteristics of family  i  that
influence its giving and may be correlated with its price and income (e.g., unobservable
0preference characteristics such as generosity and religiosity.  The term á  t  is a time trend
capturing macro effects.  Other observable characteristics that may influence giving (e.g., age,
marital status, number of dependents, education, wealth) are collectively referred to as the vector
it it it it 1 1 1 1X .  The main variables (g ,  p ,  and  y ) are in logarithms so that the ô , ð , è , and ö  parameters
1 1are elasticities: ô  is the transient price elasticity and ð  is the permanent price elasticity. 
1 1Likewise, è  and ö  are the transient and permanent income elasticities.
Equation (1) embodies the idea developed by Randolph (1995), Barrett et al. (1997), and
Bakija (2002) that expectations of future prices and incomes can affect present giving.  For
it + 1 texample, controlling for the expected future price of giving  E(p | I ), the current price affects
it it + 1 tgiving only to the extent that it deviates from the expected future price: p  ! E(p | I ).  In our
it + 1 tconceptual framework the term  E(p | I )  captures the notion of a long-run price—the expected
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price once all known tax policy changes are implemented and no further policy changes are
it + 1 t it it + 1 texpected.  In this sense E(p | I )  captures “permanent” price effects and  p  ! E(p | I ) 
captures “transitory” price effects from the family’s adjusting the timing of its giving to take
it + 1 tadvantage of pre-announced changes in tax rates that affect E(p | I ).
The impetus to model permanent and transitory price effects comes from historical
experiences such as the 1986 Tax Reform Act: it was known in October of 1986 that the price of
giving would rise in 1987 and families had plenty of time to shift to 1986 giving originally
intended to have been done in 1987 (Bakija 2002).  And families did shift a lot of giving to 1986
that would otherwise have been done in 1987 (Clotfelter 1990; Auten, Cilke and Randolph
1992).  If the transitory shift from 1987 to 1986 is not modeled, all of the drop in giving from
1986 to 1987 (Figure 2 shows the drop in charitable deductions as a percentage of personal
income) would be erroneously attributed to the permanent change in price effected by the 1986
Act.
s it it + s tEquation (1) does not include terms such as  ð   ( p  ! E(p | I ) ) for s = 2, 3, ... , T. 
Rather, equation (1) models a year-to-year intertemporal substitution, but implicitly assumes that
substitution across two-year, three-year, ..., T-year time spans is zero—an assumption routinely
made in previous work.  We will maintain this assumption in our theoretical discussion, but
check the assumption when we conduct the empirical work [yet to be done].  The assumption
that substitution across two-plus-years is zero, or at least negligible, is our first identifying
assumption. 
itOur second identifying assumption is that, holding family i’s income (y ) and other
it it + 1 t it it itcharacteristics(X ) constant,  E(p | I ,y , X ) = p  for t = 2000, 2002, and 2004—that is, the
family expects next year’s price of giving to be the same as this year’s price, as long as the
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family’s income and other characteristics are held constant.  By holding income and
characteristics constant the assumption means that a family in, say, 2000 is expecting no change
in tax policy that would set up an incentive for it to shift giving across years.  Before discussing
it + 1why we think the assumption is reasonable, we point out how we use the assumption: if E(p |
t it it it it it + 1 t it itI , y ,  X ) = p  for t = 2000, 2002, and 2004 then the transient price term p  ! E(p | I , y , X )
1 itdrops out of (1) and the permanent elasticity ð  can be identified with data on the (observable) p . 
Essentially, our assumption is that changes in price caused by the Tax Acts “surprised” families
and hence can be used to identify the permanent elasticity by estimating the response before and
after the point of surprise.
it + 1 t it it itThe argument about why it is reasonable to assume E(p | I , y , X ) = p  for t = 2000,
2002, and 2004 is detailed in Appendix A.  The Appendix A detailed argument is lengthy
because we have to consider all possible shifting—e.g., 2000²2001, 2001²2002, 2002²2003,
2003²2004, etc.—based on what a family knew in advance about each of the 2001, 2003, and
2004 Tax Acts.  Although the details of the argument are lengthy, our main point is this: each of
the three Tax Acts surprised families so that a family could not take advantage of incentives to
shift giving from the future into the present or from the present to the future.
For example, part of our argument is that the Bush-Gore election was too close to predict
and was decided too late in the year (December 13, 2000) to allow a family to shift much giving
2000²2001.  Some may dispute this, arguing that 18 days was enough time for family to shift
giving 2000²2001, but recall that much 2000 giving would have been delayed to the end of the
year, making it less likely that additional giving would have been shifted 2000²2001.  In any
event, the time series evidence in Appendix A offers, at best, only weak evidence that
2000²2001 shifting occurred.  Another part of our argument is that the incentive to shift giving
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2003²2004 shift was completely erased by the 2003 Act.  We think this part of the argument
cannot be disputed.
5.  The Center on Philanthropy Panel Study
We use data describing charitable giving from the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study. 
The Center Panel data are of very high quality compared to other survey data on giving in that
the reported amounts compare well to the distribution of charitable deductions obtained from tax
return data, except above the 90  percentile (Wilhelm 2006)th .  Other survey data lose their
comparability to tax data at much lower percentiles and, in addition, suffer from serious missing
data problems (Wilhelm 2007).
The giving–income profile and the within-income class frequency distribution of giving
as a percentage of income measured in the Center Panel and in tax data are fairly similar, again
except at the top of the income distribution (Wilhelm 2005).  At the top of the income
distribution, giving measured by the Center Panel is lower than charitable deductions from tax
return data because random sample surveys do not pick up enough families at the very top of the
income distribution to produce a precise estimate for the giving of very high-income families. 
Juster, Smith and Stafford (1999) make the same point about the PSID’s measure of wealth.  So
while the Center Panel compares well to tax return data it is important to keep in mind the
difference at the very top when thinking about the results.
The data we use to estimate (1) differ in three ways from the data from federal income tax
returns used in most studies of taxes and giving.  The first difference between our study and most
previous studies is that our sample includes non-itemizers as well as itemizers.
The second difference is that the Center Panel builds up a measure of aggregate giving
Most giving for combined purposes goes to human service organizations, and many of3
those served by human service organizations have low incomes. Brown and Rooney (2007)
estimate that 77 percent of giving for combined purposes serves people with low income.
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comparable to tax return data from a series of questions a respondent answers about amounts
given to organizations for religious purposes (i.e., to churches, synagogues, mosques, TV and
radio ministries for purposes of worship or spiritual development), combined purposes (e.g.,
United Way), basic needs (e.g., for people in need of food and shelter), health, education, and a
catch-all “other” category that includes giving to youth and family services, the arts,
environmental protection, neighborhood and community organizations, international relief, and
any other purpose the respondent mentions.  The questionnaire asks the respondent to report
religious giving separately from all other giving by instructing her to “not include donations to
schools, hospitals, and other charities run by religious organizations” in reporting religious giving
because donations for these types of purposes will be asked about later.  We combine the four
main types of (non-religious) giving—combined purposes, basic needs, health, and
education—into a “secular” giving variable, and use the estimated tax price elasticity of this
secular giving variable to answer the constitutionally-relevant treasury efficiency question.  Also,
we present price elasticities for giving that is mostly redistributive—giving to combined purposes
and to help people with basic needs.   Finally, we present 3 price elasticities for religious giving
and aggregate giving (religious plus secular).  Tax price elasticities for aggregate giving allow us
to compare our findings with previous work based on tax return data.
The third difference is that because the Center Panel is a module within the PSID, there
is a much richer set of control variables available than in tax-return based studies.  There are
variables describing education, religious affiliation, religious attendance, wealth (including home
The potential problem is that after a divorce, income often falls because there is one less4
earner in each of the two family units.  The income fall may cause a drop in the tax rate and a rise
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value and homeownership even for families no longer paying mortgage interest), wages, health,
etc.  The rich set of control variables allows us to consider instruments besides the income-based
instruments typically used in tax return-based studies.  The rich set of control variables also
allows us to check for omitted variable bias in ways not possible with tax data.
We use the PSID’s rich set of variables describing earnings, capital income, transfer
income, housing expenses (monthly payments, term of loan, property tax), child care expenses,
and demographics to estimate tax rates and payments using NBER’s TAXSIM (Feenberg and
Coutts 1993).  The only input to TAXSIM that is not available from the PSID is realized capital
gains, so we set capital gains to zero when estimating tax rates and payments.  If any of the other
variables necessary for TAXSIM are missing, we use simple imputation techniques to fill in the
missing information.  In calculating the tax payments TAXSIM incorporates state as well as
federal tax law and handles phase-outs of deductions and credits.  These two features generate
more variation in prices of giving than displayed by the six brackets in Figure 1. 
The sample we use contains families from the PSID’s nationally representative subsample
(i.e., dropping the low-income oversample) who did not experience a major change in family
structure across the 2001, 2003 and 2005 interviews, meaning that single family heads in 2001
were still single in 2005 and couples in 2001 were still couples in 2005 (couples could be
unmarried cohabitors).  The “no-major-family-structure-change” sample (henceforth, “stable”
families) ensures that our results are not affected by family structure changes that would greatly
alter family finances; however we note that tax return-based studies do not restrict their attention
to stable families, and that may be a problem.   Sixty-five percent of the PSID families from the4
in the tax price of giving.  If giving also falls it will be difficult to separate out the effect of the
divorce from the effect of the rise in tax price.  Rooney, Brown and Wu (2007) find that divorce
reduces donations in the years immediately following the divorce.
The terms “head” and “wife,” though outdated, are standard PSID terminology and have5
precise, well-understood meaning to PSID users.
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nationally representative subsample are 2001-2005 stable families (3,382 out of 5,175).  We drop
73 families who were not asked the Center Panel questions (because the respondent was neither
the head or wife, usually because the head or wife was physically or cognitively unable to
respond to the survey) and 22 families because their after-tax income was zero or negative.   The5
sample is n = 3,287.  
There are two ways to determine itemizers in the sample.  First, the PSID’s income
module directly asks the respondent if the family itemizes deductions.  However, there is some
measurement error in the responses, especially among low-income respondents (too many of
whom respond that they itemize; Ackerman and Auten 2006).  Second, TAXSIM output includes
whether the family itemizes based on variables in the PSID.  A key variable used by TAXSIM,
the mortgage interest payment, is itself estimated from several PSID variables, and likely
contains measurement error.  Despite these sources of measurement error, the PSID direct
question about itemization agrees with the TAXSIM determination of itemization for 80 percent
of the sample.
The effects of the measurement errors in the two determinations of itemization can be
particularly harmful if they lead us to mis-identify those who switch itemization status. 
Therefore, we attempt to reduce the effects of the measurement errors by including in our
analysis only families for whom the PSID direct question about itemization agrees with the
TAXSIM determination of itemization.  This leaves us with a sample of “verified” never-
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itemizers, always-itemizers, and switchers.
Finally, we only include verified always-itemizers and switchers in our analysis if they
would have itemized even if their charitable giving had been zero—so-called “exogenous
itemizers.”  The people we exclude—those who TAXSIM determines itemized because their
charitable giving is so high—likely are making their itemization and giving choices
simultaneously (“endogenous itemizers”) and including them would bias our estimates toward
the finding that giving is price elastic.
Table 2 presents a first look at the data by presenting summary statistics for 2000 and
2004.  The sample consists of n = 985 verified never-itemizers (families that did not itemize in
either 2000 or 2004, as determined by both the PSID direct question and the TAXSIM
itemization determination),  n = 186 verified switchers (families that itemized in either 2000 or
2004, as determined by both the PSID and TAXSIM, and TAXSIM determines their itemization
to be exogenous), and  n = 777 verified always-itemizers (families that itemized in both 2000 and
2004, as determined by both the PSID and TAXSIM, and TAXSIM determines their itemization
to be exogenous).  Among the switchers, n = 104 went from not itemizing in 2000 to itemizing in
2004 (“0-to-1 switchers”) and therefore experienced a drop in the price of giving.  The remaining
n = 82 switchers switched in the other direction (“1-to-0 switchers”) and experienced a price rise. 
Among the n = 777 always-itemizers, n = 220 experienced a price drop and the remaining n =
557 experienced a price rise.
Table 2 begins with the price of giving the first dollar to a charitable organization, the
“first-dollar price.”  For the never-itemizers, the price of giving is, of course, $1.00 in both years.
Among the switchers the average price drops from .90 to .87, a small !.03 drop.  But this small
drop masks large price drops and large price rises within this group.  For the 0-to-1 switchers, the
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first-dollar price of giving drops on average from $1.00 to $0.77, a 23 percent price drop.  For the
1-to-0 switchers, the price of giving rises on average 23 percent.  For the always-itemzers, the
price rises from $0.71 to $0.74, an average increase of four percent.  Among the always-itemizers
experiencing a price drop, the price drops five percent, and among the always-itemzers
experiencing a price rise, the price rises nine percent on average.  Not surprisingly, the switchers
experience larger price changes than do always-itemizers.  The last row in this section presents
the price change for all the observations in the sample.
Table 2 continues with the “first-dollar after-tax income”—that is, the family’s income
minus taxes owed before tax reductions due to charitable giving are calculated.  For never-
itemizers, after-tax income increases by $1,315.  For 0-to-1 switchers the average income
increase is much larger: $22,601.  The income drop among 1-to-0 switchers is also large:
!$11,544.  Always-itemizers have a $9,643 increase on average.  Among the always-itemizers
experiencing a price drop, after-tax income increases $29,668, but among the always-itemizers
experiencing a price increase, after-tax income increases only $1,733.
We note that for both 0-to-1 switchers and always-itemizers experiencing a price drop,
the average income increase is large.  Also, for 1-to-0 switchers the average income decrease is
large.  This means that for much of the sample experiencing a price change, income is changing
in the opposite direction, with the implication that the effects on giving of changes in price are
hard to distinguish from changes in income.  This is a well-known problem in the taxes and
giving literature.  Another reason we regard our present results as preliminary is that we have
some ideas about how to distinguish price effects from income effects, but we have not yet
implemented these ideas.
The next section in Table 2 presents secular giving, the giving relevant for the treasury
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efficiency question.  Secular giving among never-itemizers decreases by $10 between 2000 and
2004.  Among 0-to-1 switchers secular giving increases $210, but among 1-to-0 switchers the
giving change is negligible.  Among always-itemizers experiencing a price drop, secular giving
increases by $250, and even among always-itemizers experiencing a price rise giving increases a
little ($43).  Giving to help people with basic needs in the next section shows a similar pattern.
The next section of Table 2 presents religious giving.  Religious giving increases $344
among 0-to-1 switchers, drops !$130 among 1-to-0 switchers, increases $342 among always-
itemizers experiencing a price drop, and increases a little ($85) among always-itemizers
experiencing a price rise.  The religious giving pattern is qualitatively similar to the secular
giving pattern, with the exception that among 1-to-0 switchers religious giving drops (!$130)
whereas the secular giving change is negligible ($1).  However, the magnitudes of the religious
giving changes are larger than the secular giving changes.  The larger responsiveness of religious
giving compared to secular giving in these summary statistics lends credence to our concern that
price elasticities estimated with aggregate giving may be influenced by changes in religious
giving that fall outside the bounds of the treasury efficiency question.
The final section in Table 2 presents aggregate giving (secular + religious).  Aggregate
giving among 0-to-1 switchers increases $719, and among 1-to-0 switchers decreases !$143. 
Among always-itemizers experiencing a price drop aggregate giving increases $721, but even
among always-itemizers experiencing a price rise giving increases $225.
6.  Results 
Table 3 contains our main results.  The dependent variable in each regression is the 2004-
minus-2000 change in the log secular giving.  The independent variables are the 2004 minus
Of course, by including families only if they gave in 2000, 2004, or both we are selecting6
on the dependent variable and thereby potentially introducing sample selection bias.  In the future
version we will use Honoré’s (1992) fixed-effects Tobit to properly handle the zero-giving years. 
For the present we exclude families who give zero in both years because our first-difference,
least-squares regression treats a never-giving family as if there was no change in their giving, just
like a family who gives $500 in both years.
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2000 changes in the log tax price (first-dollar), the log after-tax income (first-dollar), marital
status, over-65 exemptions, and the number of dependents.  The first column shows the results
for the switchers, and column 2 shows the results for the always-itemizers.  For both switchers
and always-itemizers we include families only if they gave to a charitable organization in at least
one of the two years 2000 or 2004 (or in both years): n = 140 out of the 186 switchers and n =
717 out of the 777 always-itemizers gave in at least one of the two years.  We present ordinary
least-squares estimates.  In the future version of the paper we will use more advanced methods to
account for families giving zero in one or both of the years.   We expect the advanced methods to6
produce changes in the results, but only minor changes.  But for the present, our results should be
interpreted as applying only to families that give in at least one year.
Column 1 shows that the estimate of the price elasticity of giving among switchers is
!2.00 (s.e. = .70).  This large price response is our estimate of the deductibility-switcher
elasticity that should be used to evaluate treasury efficiency and, further, the secular giving
dependent variable means that the estimate can be used to evaluate constitutionally-relevant
treasury efficiency.  The large point estimate implies that deductibility is treasury efficient.  The
95 percent confidence interval is !3.39 to !.62, meaning that although elasticities less than one
cannot be categorically ruled out, most of the interval lies to the left of !1: the hypothesis that the
elasticity is less than or equal to !1 cannot be rejected.
The estimate of the price elasticity of giving among always-itemizers in column 2 is
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qualitatively similar, though smaller in magnitude: !1.45 (s.e. = .93).  The 95 percent confidence
interval is wider: zero price responsiveness cannot be ruled out at conventional significance
levels, but 10 percent significance is just missed (p-value = .12).  Again, the hypothesis that the
elasticity among always-itemizers is less than or equal to !1 cannot be rejected.
Table 4 presents estimates from models similar to those in Table 3, but for different
definitions of charitable giving as the dependent variables.  The specification of the independent
variables is identical to the independent variables in Table 3, but Table 4 presents only the tax
price elasticity estimates.  Hence, each estimate in Table 4 is a price elasticity from a different
regression.  Column 1 contains the regressions for switchers and column 2 contains the
regressions for always-itemizers.
Row 1 repeats Table 3's price elasticities for secular giving to allow easy comparison. In
row 2, the charitable giving is that for combined purposes and for helping people with basic
needs, giving that is mostly redistributive.  The price elasticity estimates among both switchers
and always-itemizers are similar to their row 1 counterparts.  The price elasticities for religious
giving in row 3 are different: the estimated elasticity among switchers is !2.50 (s.e. = 1.08),
somewhat larger in magnitude than the secular elasticity.   The estimated elasticity among
always-itemizers is !.77 (s.e. = 1.05), smaller but not significantly different from the secular
elasticity.
Row 4 presents the estimates for aggregate giving (secular plus religious).  Among
switchers the estimate is !2.02 (s.e. = .52), still indicating a large price response.  In contrast,
among always-itemizers the estimate is !.73 (s.e. = .60).  This is the estimate that most closely
mimics the previous literature—it answers the always-itemizer price elasticity question rather
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than the deductibility-switcher question and it includes religious giving rather than focus on the
constitutionally-relevant treasury efficiency question.  Although the hypothesis that the always-
itemizer elasticity is less than or equal to !1 cannot be rejected, the !.73 point estimate itself
suggests that deductibility is not treasury efficient, similar to the conclusion reached by Randolph
(1995) if one interprets the !.73 estimate as an estimate of the permanent elasticity.  Comparing
the !.73 estimate to the column 1, row 1 estimate of !2.00 indicates that asking the deductibility-
switcher question and asking about the kind of giving that is constitutionally-relevant in terms of
the treasury efficiency question does matter.
7.  Discussion and Conclusion
Most of the previous literature on taxes and giving has estimated the price elasticity of
aggregate giving (including religious giving) using samples of families who always itemize.   The
previous literatures’ price elasticity estimates are then used to infer indirectly the price elasticity
of constitutionally-relevant giving (excluding religious giving) for families who switch
itemization status.  Using new panel data on charitable giving—the Center on Philanthropy
Panel Study—we are able to directly estimate the price elasticity of constitutionally-relevant
giving on a sample of families who actually switch itemization status.  In addition, we follow the
procedures of the previous literature by estimating the price elasticity of aggregate giving using a
sample of families who always itemize.
The estimates from the two procedures are different.  The direct estimate of the price
elasticity of constitutionally-relevant giving indicates that the tax deductibility of giving is
treasury efficient—giving induced by deductibility is greater than the foregone tax revenue that
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the government would be constitutionally allowed to send to the charitable organizations.  In
contrast, the estimate of the price elasticity of aggregate giving using a sample of families who
always itemize is smaller—if this estimate were used to infer whether the deductibility of
constitutionally-relevant giving is treasury efficient, we would conclude that deductibility is not
treasury efficient.  Nevertheless, the price elasticity of aggregate giving among always-itemizers
answers an important policy question: How did the tax rate cuts in the 2001-2004 Tax Acts affect
charitable giving?  Our preliminary result is that among always-itemizers, charitable giving
changed little: the effects on giving of the tax price increase caused by cutting tax rates and the
income increase caused by raising after-tax incomes offset each other.
Our results are preliminary for several reasons, but the most important reason is that we
have not implemented our strategy to determine how much of the price elasticity we estimate is a
permanent response.  The other reasons our results are preliminary form a list of additional tasks
we will do in the future version of the paper:
• use instrumental variable methods to identify the permanent effect of taxes on giving,
and to mitigate the measurement error in itemization status
• properly handle the econometrics of the zero-giving years
• check the sensitivity of the results to the use of controls available in the PSID but not in
the tax return data.
Although our results are preliminary, they provide an early indication that the data
advantages delivered by the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study allow us to ask policy questions
that previously could not be asked.  The early answers to those questions suggest that the data
advantages matter.  Substantively, the early answers suggest that deductibility induces more
giving to the charitable organizations constitutionally eligible for government funding than the
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government itself could provide by eliminating deductibility and sending the increased tax
revenues directly to the organizations.
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Table 1.  Federal Tax Rates and the Price of Giving in Effect from 2000–2004.
Year
2000 Income bracket 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Tax Rates (percent)
           $0     to        $11,999 15 15 10 10 10a
  $12,000     to        $43,849 15 15 15 15 15a
  $43,850     to      $105,949 28 27.5 27 25 25
$105,950     to      $161,449 31 30.5 30 28 28
$161,450     to      $288,349 36 35.5 35 33 33
$288,350     and           over 39.6 39.1 38.6 35 35
Price of giving for itemizers (cost of a one dollar gift)
           $0     to        $11,999 .85 .85 .90 .90 .90
  $12,000     to        $43,849 .85 .85 .85 .85 .85
  $43,850     to      $105,949 .72 .725 .73 .75 .75
$105,950     to      $161,449 .69 .695 .70 .72 .72
$161,450     to      $288,349 .64 .645 .65 .67 .67
$288,350     and           over .604 .609 .614 .65 .65
Percentage increase in price 2000 to 2002
           $0     to        $11,999       |----------     5.9     ----------| 
  $12,000     to        $43,849       |----------        0     ----------| 
  $43,850     to      $105,949       |----------     1.4     ----------| 
$105,950     to      $161,449       |----------     1.4     ----------| 
$161,450     to      $288,349       |----------     1.6     ----------| 
$288,350     and           over       |----------     1.7     ----------| 
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Percentage increase in price 2000 to 2004
           $0     to        $11,999       |--------------------     5.9     ----------------| 
  $12,000     to        $43,849       |--------------------        0     ----------------| 
  $43,850     to      $105,949       |--------------------     4.2     ----------------| 
$105,950     to      $161,449       |--------------------     4.3     ----------------| 
$161,450     to      $288,349       |--------------------     4.7     ----------------| 
$288,350     and           over       |--------------------     7.6     ----------------| 
Notes: The table does not describe the shifts in brackets that occurred between 2000 and 2004;
see Figure 1.
 This bracket became effective in 2002.a
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Table 2.  Sample Means for Never-Itemizers, Always-Itemizers, and Switchers: 
2000 and 2004.
Variable (in bold) and sample
2000 2004 Difference
(2004 ! 2000)
Price
   Never-itemizers 1.00 1.00 .00
   Switchers .90 .87 !.03
              Did not itemize in 2000, but
                  itemized in 2004 (price drops)
1.00 .77 !.23
              Itemized in 2000, but
                  did not itemize in 2004 (price rises)
.77 1.00 .23
    Always-itemizers .71 .74 .03
              Price drops .76 .72 !.04
              Price rises .68 .74 .06
   All .87 .88 .01
After-tax income
   Never-itemizers 31,845 33,179 1,315
   Switchers 58,027 65,575 7,548
              Did not itemize in 2000, but
                  itemized in 2004 (price drops)
52,184 74,785 22,601
              Itemized in 2000, but
                  did not itemize in 2004 (price rises)
65,438 53,894 !11,544
    Always-itemizers  103,561 113,204 9,643
              Price drops 83,953 113,620 29,668
              Price rises  111,306 113,039 1,733
   All 62,950 68,210 5,234
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2000 mean 2004 mean Difference
Secular giving
   Never-itemizers 119 110 !10
   Switchers 252 370 118
              Did not itemize in 2000, but
                  itemized in 2004  (price drops)
204 414 210
              Itemized in 2000, but
                  did not itemize in 2004  (price rises)
314 315 1
    Always-itemizers 1,041 1,143 102
              Price drops 797 1,047 250
              Price rises 1,138 1,182 43
   All 500 547 47
Combined purpose and basic needs giving
   Never-itemizers 93 81 !12
   Switchers 205 293 88
              Did not itemize in 2000, but
                  itemized in 2004  (price drops)
172 325 153
              Itemized in 2000, but
                  did not itemize in 2004  (price rises)
246 251 5
    Always-itemizers 717 762 45
              Price drops 609 752 142
              Price rises 760 766 6
   All 353 373 20
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2000 mean 2004 mean Difference
Religious giving
   Never-itemizers 306 351 45
   Switchers 275 409 135
              Did not itemize in 2000, but
                  itemized in 2004  (price drops)
228 572 344
              Itemized in 2000, but
                  did not itemize in 2004  (price rises)
333 203 !130
    Always-itemizers 1,558 1,716 159
              Price drops 1,029 1,372 342
              Price rises 1,767 1,852 85
   All 803 901 99
Aggregate giving
   Never-itemizers 447 500 53
   Switchers 567 907 339
              Did not itemize in 2000, but
                  itemized in 2004  (price drops)
451 1,170 719
              Itemized in 2000, but
                  did not itemize in 2004  (price rises)
715 572 !143
    Always-itemizers 2,831 3,196 365
              Price drops 1,970 2,691 721
              Price rises 3,171 3,395 225
   All 1,409 1,614 205
Notes: All the entries in the table are in dollars.  All the observations (n = 1,948) have verified
itemization status in both 2000 and 2004.  Also, all the itemizers are exogenous itemizers.  The
sample is split into three groups: never-itemizers, switchers, and always-itemizers.  Switchers are
also split into two groups: those who do not itemize in 2000 and switch to itemizing in 2004 (price
drops for them), and those who itemize in 2000 and switch to not itemizing in 2004 (price rises for
them).  Similarly, always-itemizers are also split into two groups: those for whom the price drops
from 2000 to 2004, and those for whom the price rises.
(notes continue on the next page)
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Sample sizes are: 
Never-itemizers n = 985
Switchers n = 186
Did not itemize in 2000, but 
itemized in 2004 n = 104
Itemized in 2000, but 
did not itemize in 2004 n =   82
Always-itemizers n = 777
Price drops from 2000 to 2004 n = 220
Price rises from 2000 to 2004 n = 557
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Table 3.  The 2004-2000 Change in Log Secular Giving.
Independent variables
Switchers Always-itemizers
    Log price (first-dollar) !2.00***
(.70)
!1.45
(.93)
    Log after-tax income (first-dollar) .26
(.25)
.41*
(.21)
    Married .03
(.75)
.91
(.74)
    Age 65 or older !.91
(.97)
!.75*
(.42)
    Number of dependents .46*
(.27)
.10
(.09)
    constant .45 .19
adjusted - R .12 .022
n 140 717
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log secular giving 2004 !2000.  Secular giving is
giving to combined purposes, basic needs, health, and education.  The independent variables are
the 2004 !2000 changes in the indicated variable.
In column 1 the sample contains families who switched itemization status between 2000
and 2004.  In column 2 the sample contains families who itemized in both 2000 and 2004.  Both
samples contain only verified itemizers and exogenous itemizers.  Both samples contain only
families who gave in either 2000 or 2004, or in both years.
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 – significant at .01  – significant at .10*** *
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Table 4.  Price Elasticities for Different Kinds of Giving.
Dependent variable
Switchers Always-itemizers
    Secular giving !2.00***
(.70)
[140]
!1.45
(.93)
[717]
    Combined purpose and basic needs giving !1.80**
(.84)
[125]
!1.32
(1.10)
[679]
    Religious giving !2.50**
(1.08)
[104]
!.77
(1.05)
[575]
    Aggregate giving !2.02***
(.52)
[161]
!.73
(.60)
[765]
Notes: The dependent variables are the changes in log giving 2004 !2000 for the different kinds of
giving listed in the left-most column.  The estimates shown are price elasticities estimated from the
2004 !2000 change in the log first-dollar price—each estimate comes from a different regression. 
The other independent variables included in each regression, but not shown in Table 4, are the
same as in Table 3.
In column 1 the sample contains families who switched itemization status between 2000
and 2004.  In column 2 the sample contains families who itemized in both 2000 and 2004.  Both
samples contain only verified itemizers and exogenous itemizers.  Both samples contain only
families who gave in either 2000 or 2004, or in both years.
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Sample sizes are in square brackets.
 – significant at .01  – significant at .05*** **
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it + 1 t itAppendix A.  The Argument that E(p | I ) = p  for t = 2000, 2002, and 2004.
Now we construct an argument that the 2001-2004 tax acts were passed in such a way that
it + 1 t it it it + 1 tresulted in E(p | I ) = p  for t = 2000, 2002, and 2004.  Then the p  ! E(p | I ) term drops out of
1 it(1) and the permanent elasticity â  can be identified with data on the (observable) p .  The
maintained assumption that substitution across two-or-more-year spans is negligible and the
it + 1 t itimplication of the 2001-2004 tax acts that E(p | I ) = p  are our strategy to identify the permanent
price elasticity.
The argument starts with the price elasticity, assuming for the moment that prices change
but after-tax income does not.  The 2001 Act eventually would effect a permanent increase in the
price of giving, but this increase was to be phased in over 2001-2006 giving a family the incentive
to shift giving from the future to the present.  We must consider how much giving was shifted from
the future into 2000 (2000²future) and how much was shifted from the future into 2002
(2002²future).  We argue that it is likely that very little giving was shifted 2000²future: the 2001
Act was signed into law (obviously) well after year 2000 giving was complete and back in 2000
there was large uncertainty about what future tax policy would be.  Although in 2000 everyone
would have thought that a Bush victory in the 2000 presidential election would increase the
likelihood of a tax cut and a Gore victory would increase the likelihood of a tax increase, the
election was very close and not decided until the Supreme Court’s ruling on December 13, 2000. 
That left very little time for a family to shift to 2000 giving intended to have been done in 2001
even if the family on December 13 now expected a 2001 tax cut.
Even though there was still some time left to effect a shift, the time series evidence of
charitable deductions shown in Figure 2 at best offers only weak evidence that shifting occurred:
it + 1 t itIt turns out that t = 2001 is the only year from 2000 to 2004 that E(p | I )  p .  7
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there is a 2000-to-2001 drop in charitable deductions as a percentage of personal income
(consistent with a 2000²2001 shift), but the drop is not nearly as dramatic as the 1986-to-1987
drop.  In addition, stock prices (the Standard and Poor’s 500 index divided by 1,000 is plotted with
triangles alongside deductions) were falling at the same time, in contrast to the stock price increase
over 1986-to-1987.  Hence, the evidence of a 2000²2001 shift is much weaker than the evidence
of a 1986²1987 shift, and could be a response to changes in the stock market rather than a
temporary shift in response to tax policy.  In short, we argue very little 2000²2001 shifting
occurred.  During 2000, families expected the price of giving to be the same in 2001 as it was in
i2001 2000 i20002000: E(p | I ) = p .
Similarly, we argue that very little 2001²2002 shifting occurred.  To make this part of the
argument and to trace through the sequences of changes set into motion by the 2001 and
subsequent tax acts, we discuss a family in 2001 with taxable income at $100,000; but the
argument generalizes to families with other levels of taxable income.  In 2001 the $100,000 family
faced a 27.5 percent federal marginal tax rate, a price of giving equal to .725.  Assuming that no
change in income was expected (an assumption to be relaxed below), that family knew its price of
giving would be .73 in 2001.  We argue that this small price increase (less than one percent) would
have caused little 2001²2002 shifting.   Putting this argument together with the argument in the7
previous paragraph, we conclude that little 2000²2002 shifting occurred.
We next consider how much giving might have been shifted from the future into 2002. 
Following the previous paragraph’s family with $100,000 taxable income, in 2002 that family
expected no price change in 2003, but a price rise to .74 in 2004, no change again in 2005, and a
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price rise to .75 in 2006.  There is no tax advantage for a 2002²2003 shift in giving because
i2003 2002 i2002E(p | I ) = p , but, in principle, there is advantage for a two-year shift: 2002²2004. 
However, recall our maintained assumption that intertemporal substitution across two-or-more-
year spans is negligible.
We have to consider 2003²2004 shifting as well.  As just described, under the 2001 Act
the family we are following would have, in 2003, anticipated a tax advantage by a 2003²2004
shift in giving because in 2003 the price was .73 and in 2004 the price would be .74.  This
incentive to 2003²2004 shift giving, albeit small, was completely erased by the 2003 Act: the
i2004 2003 i2003family’s price was immediately raised to .75 for 2003 and 2004 causing E(p | I ) = p .  The
price level was scheduled to remain .75 until 2011.  Shifting from 2004ÿ2011, we assume, is
negligible.
In summary, our argument is that the 2001, 2003, and 2004 tax acts were such that little-to-
no shifting occurred either into, or out of, 2000, 2002, and 2004.  This mitigated transitory
responses to the price changes, allowing us to identify a permanent response.
Of course, this identification strategy depends on the validity of the assumption that
it + 1 t itsubstitution across two-or-more-year spans is negligible and the argument that E(p | I ) = p .  The
it + 1 t itargument that E(p | I ) = p  we have made is for a family with constant income (say $100,000) so
that the only changes in prices are driven by changes in the tax acts.  
Recall that the 2001, 2003, and 2003 tax acts made other changes in tax policy that raised
the price for some families (raising the standard deduction for all married-joint families to 200
percent of the single standard deduction, and  the increase of the 15 percent bracket amount for
married-joint families to 200 percent of the single 15 percent bracket amount) and increased the
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after-tax income of some families (the child tax credit).  In both cases, the arguments about shifting
we made above about tax rates apply again: the changes were such that little-to-no shifting
occurred, and this mitigated transitory responses to the changes.
The tax rate cuts raised after-tax income at the same time they raised prices.  Holding pre-
tax income constant, any cross-year shifting in giving to take advantage of transitory differences in
it it + 1 t it it + 1 tafter-tax income,  y  ! E(y | I ) , would have been zero in the years  p  ! E(p | I ) was zero, and
it it + 1 twould have been in the opposite direction of the price-induced shifting in the years  p  ! E(p | I )
was not zero.  The opposite direction shifting to take advantage of transitory differences in after-
tax income would further mitigate any shifting to take advantage of anticipated differences in price.
